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‘‘What our health-care systems need to do with their
limited budgets is maximize value and no dimensions
of health … will be a good measure of value because
people consider other aspects in their evaluations …
We must back out of the dead end that is pursuing
overall efficiency’’ [1].
1 Introduction
We are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the
results of McDonald et al. [2]. In this note, we summarize
their findings, build on their interpretations, and suggest
future directions for researchers interested in improving a
health technology assessment (HTA) process.
2 Summary of the Findings
McDonald et al. searched for reasons why Canada and
other countries might separate their cancer drug HTA
process. They appraised whether any of the rationales they
found were derived from the assumption commonly made
by health economists that ‘‘the goal of society or decision
makers is to maximize the total aggregate health benefit
conferred to a population for a given level of resources’’.
They found that this rationale was not used by Canada or
any country to support the use of a separate HTA process
for cancer drugs. The researchers were also not able to find
another country besides Canada that had a separate cancer
drug HTA process.
These findings may seem surprising: Canada is the only
country in the world that has a separate cancer drug HTA
process; and McDonald et al. could find no justification
based in economic theory for a separate process. To be
clear, the authors reported that other countries (e.g. Den-
mark, Belgium, the UK) set aside a separate budget for
cancer drugs, and the authors found several ‘‘non-eco-
nomic’’ rationales for Canada’s separate HTA process.
There are two potential interpretations of these search re-
sults: (1) the search missed something or (2) there really
is no economic rationale in print for a separate cancer
drug HTA process. Although their study might not be








Anthony L. A. Fields
afields@ualberta.ca
1 Centre for Excellence in Economic Analysis Research
(CLEAR), Li Ka Shing Knowledge Institute, St. Michael’s
Hospital, Toronto, ON, Canada
2 Pharmacoeconomics Research Unit, Cancer Care Ontario,
Toronto, ON, Canada
3 Canadian Centre for Applied Research in Cancer Control
(ARCC), Toronto, ON, Canada
4 Institute for Health Policy, Management and Evaluation,
University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
5 Pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review (pCODR), Canadian
Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH),
Toronto, ON, Canada
6 Saskatchewan Cancer Agency, Saskatoon, SK, Canada
7 University of Alberta, 11560 University Ave NW, Edmonton,
AB T6G 1Z2, Canada
PharmacoEconomics (2015) 33:879–882
DOI 10.1007/s40273-015-0278-7
considered a methodologically robust systematic review,
one could reasonably assume that McDonald et al. found
all of the key documents. If one feels comfortable with the
study’s findings that no evidence exists, then it is important
to consider what the findings really mean.
3 Additional Interpretations
One way to view the findings of McDonald et al. is to
consider the context in which the separate cancer drug
HTA process was developed. Perhaps Canadian decision
makers did not need an economic rationale for them to
decide to create their own separate cancer drug HTA sys-
tem. While it does not appear common for countries to set
up separate HTA systems, in Canada, this happens. For
example, nearly a decade ago, the province of Ontario
created the Committee to Evaluate Drugs-Cancer Care
Ontario (CCO) Subcommittee to review cancer drugs and
to produce drug funding recommendations for the Com-
mittee to Evaluate Drugs (CED). The CED reviewed all
drugs and produced funding recommendations for the
Ontario Public Drug Programs in the Ministry of Health.
For all drugs, both cancer and non-cancer, the funding
decision was then made by Ontario’s Executive Officer,
taking into account the CED’s recommendations. Thus,
Ontario had a separate cancer drug HTA system that
Canada used as its blueprint.
Canada’s interim Joint Oncology Drug Review was
based on Ontario’s existing review process for cancer
drugs, and the interim Canadian process was in place until
a permanent process was approved based on an evaluation
of iJODR [3]. All participating provinces had access to
recommendations made by both the CED and the CED-
CCO Subcommittee with respect to the listing of oncology
drugs [3]. After more than 3 years of experience from the
interim process, the provinces through the Steering Com-
mittee of the pan-Canadian Oncology Drug Review
(pCODR) created for themselves a permanent, separate
cancer drug HTA process, modeled after Ontario’s separate
cancer drug HTA process. The resulting process is similar
to what Ontario had: the cancer drug funding recommen-
dation from a review committee with cancer expertise (now
from the pCODR’s Expert Review Committee and not the
CED-CCO Subcommittee) is sent to the CED to make its
recommendation before Ontario’s Executive Officer makes
his/her funding decision. Thus, Ontario receives separate
cancer drug funding recommendations from the pCODR
(see Fig. 1), but the provincial funding recommendation is
still made by the CED (a committee that reviews all drugs)
and the provincial funding decision is still made by the
Executive Officer (a person who makes funding decisions
about all drugs).
In Ontario, a separate cancer drug HTA system is about
who makes the first funding recommendation. Ontario has
a predisposition for separate HTA processes, as they also
have a separate process for devices and medical tech-
nologies in addition to the separate HTA process for cancer
drugs. It is possible that the reason the provinces designed
and built for themselves a separate HTA process at the
national level may be related to the reason that Ontario
designed and built for itself a separate HTA process. No
economic rationale may have been provided in print or
otherwise. However, creating and running a separate HTA
process takes a lot of work. The separate process may not
have been justified based on a publicly reported economic
rationale, but that does not mean it is not justifiable. Is it a
paradox that economic rationale is not evident in a process
that requires a cost-effectiveness analysis as ‘‘economic
evidence?’’ Perhaps there are other objectives that are be-
ing optimized, and perhaps researchers should explore this.
This interpretation may stimulate health economists’
desire to be more involved in HTA policy matters. Two
options include (1) explaining to decision makers (e.g.
through scientific publications) that they are not behaving
as economics dictates they should or (2) studying how we
can be of assistance and then attempting to do that.
McDonald et al.’s article can be viewed as demonstrating
the futility of the first option. If the system is not set up
with a stated economic rationale, it is likely that policy
advice based on economic rationale (that contradicts
established policy directions) will fail. Statements doubting
that decision makers can be assumed to know their will-
ingness to pay (WTP) because they cannot find answers to
the theoretical problems we assume they have (e.g.
knowing the incremental costs and benefits of all programs,
Fig. 1 Example of activity (recommendation vs. funding) by level
(e.g. pan-Canadian vs. provincial). CDEC Canadian Drug Expert
Committee (a pan-Canadian non-cancer drug funding recommenda-
tion committee), CED Committee to Evaluate Drugs (an Ontario all
drug funding recommendation committee), pERC pan-Canadian
Oncology Drug Expert Review Committee (a pan-Canadian cancer
drug funding recommendation committee), MOH Ministry of Health
(in Ontario all drug funding decisions are made by a decision maker
called the Executive Officer)
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coping with indivisibilities and non-constant returns to
scale in programs) is a convenient way for analysts to fit
real-world policy making into their academic paradigm.
These statements suggest either ignorance of practical is-
sues facing those who actually do HTAs or willingness to
ignore the opportunity to be useful. Technical concerns are
correct in theory but may be useless in practice when
people have to make recommendations or decisions with-
out this knowledge. This is not a hypothetical situation; it
happens every month when recommendation committees
or decision makers convene. This leaves option (2) study-
ing how we can be of assistance as a promising direction
for future research.
4 Future Research
As McDonald et al. cannot find justification for a separate
cancer drug HTA process using one particular economic
hypothesis (e.g. that review bodies exist to help decision
makers make resource allocation decisions to maximize
health), perhaps a new hypothesis is needed. A good al-
ternative hypothesis would explain what we actually do
see. New hypotheses could be guided by insights from
structured conversations with those involved in the sepa-
rate HTA process [4, 5] and by building on previous work
in the area of the role of economic evidence in Canadian
oncology reimbursement decision making [6]. Because the
pCODR was designed as a separate process by the pro-
vinces for the provinces, it provides clues through revealed
preferences on how the provinces wanted to set up the
structure and process.
For example, the pCODR requires its Expert Review
Committee to create for the provinces non-binding recom-
mendations using a deliberative framework. The framework
considers (1) clinical evidence; (2) economic evidence; (3)
patient perspectives; and (4) system feasibility. There are no
thresholds for any of these dimensions. Moreover, this
framework indicates there is more than economic evidence
considered for recommendations, suggesting there is more
than economic considerations that matter for decision
makers too. After the pCODR issues a recommendation,
each province can make its own funding decision. In On-
tario, the pERC recommendation goes to the CED (which
considers all drugs) for a recommendation. Ontario’s Ex-
ecutive Officer has both pCODR’s and the CED’s recom-
mendations when he/she negotiates with the drug company
over whether and how the drug will be covered. These ne-
gotiations happen behind closed doors and are confidential.
As a result, people who know what happens, cannot tell you
(by law), and people who tell you what happens cannot
know (by law). Additionally, because decisions are made
behind closed doors and recommendations are not, the
advice one hears about what is useful is from an academic
or recommendation point of view, but it is usually not from
a decision-making point of view. For example, if there is a
threshold that is used for WTP, it may never be known
because the real price payers receive is not reported.
Without the real price (that changed the cost-effectiveness
estimate from[to\WTP), there is no way to know the real
WTP. Last, decisions made behind closed doors do not in-
volve the capacity that was there to review the clinical and
economic evidence; the audiences are different. Fancy tools
may not be useful and subtle distinctions may not be
appreciated.
Given this context, why do Canadian decision makers
want a separate cancer drug HTA process? If the eco-
nomics rationale currently being endorsed cannot answer
this question, this suggests we need new thinking. The
work of McDonald et al. reminds us that economics is
about scarcity, choices, and opportunity cost. These con-
cepts apply as well for how we spend our time as re-
searchers in the field of HTA. An economic rationale may
be difficult to find for why Canada has a separate cancer
drug HTA process, but other valid rationales do exist.
Future research could develop a better understanding of
what are the structural, procedural, and outcome-based
objectives that decision makers desire. Perhaps 100 %
transparency is not their main goal. Nevertheless, through
observation of their behavior and discussion, it is possible
to perceive a revealed preference for a separate cancer drug
HTA process. If provinces are assumed to maximize some
objective function, then there must be some good that
comes from a separate cancer drug HTA process. Beyond
the development for HTA of a new culture and innovative
methods and processes, the provinces value the pCODR;
when the pCODR was recently moved under the gover-
nance of the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies
in Health, a commitment was made to keep it a separate
process for cancer drugs. Cancer drugs are reviewed by the
pCODR’s Expert Review Committee and non-cancer drugs
are reviewed by the Common Drug Review’s Canadian
Drug Expert Committee (see Fig. 1). Future research could
study what provinces’ rationales and objectives are for
setting up the system they have set up for themselves.
Then, we must use our skills as researchers to help them
achieve what society has endorsed them to achieve through
their role as socially legitimate decision makers.
As HTA researchers, we must continue to develop and
apply new methods of analyzing data and displaying in-
formation. We must also face the reality that the purpose of
our role may be to promote goals related to process rather
than outcome, suggesting that getting the question of in-
terest right may be more important for researchers than
correctly solving the wrong problem. There is tension be-
tween that which is theoretically ideal and that which is
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practically useful. McDonald et al.’s findings can be
viewed as a reminder that our future research priorities
should be to explore how to bridge this gap by connecting
academically based health economists with problems from
reality and practically based decision makers with solutions
from theory. In conclusion, McDonald et al.’s findings
point to the need for researchers to consider a broader view
of what decision makers want and what we can do to make
our research more useful. Politicians, not economists, are
making strategic decisions for the healthcare system; the
rationale driving policy on cancer drug HTA may not be
from economic theory (or it might but decision makers may
have a more complex objective function). We should en-
deavor to optimize given these binding constraints.
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